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VOID, ILLEGAL OR UNENFORCEABLE CONSID-
ERATION.
The subject of consideration in contracts presents many inter-
esting lphases, but no questions connected with the subject are more
interesting or more difficult of satisfactory solution than those aris-
ing where part of the consideration is void-, illegal or unenforceable,
the other part of the consideration being valid.
The distinction between void, illegal and unenforceable considera-
tions must be noted, as the results where one is found may be entirely
different from those produced by another.
It should also be remembered that the term "illegal" is not
always used by the courts in the same sense, but is sometimes
intended to stand for that which is simply void, sometimes for that
which is only malum prohibitum, and again for that which is malum
in se.
In the discussion of the questions growing out of thi subject
one naturally begins with Pigot's Case, II Coke Rep. 27b, decided
in 1615, where it was -held that if some of the covenants of an inden-
ture or of the conditions endorsed upon a bond are against law, and
some good and lawful, the covenants or conditions which are against
law are void ab initio and the others stand good.
This principle of law which comes down through the cases is no
better stated in recent decisions than in Widoe v. Webb, 20 0. S.
435. The court there said that where for a legal consideration a
party undertakes to do one or more acts and some of them are
unlawful, the contract is gocd for so much as is lawful and void for
the residue. Whenever the unlawful part of the contract can be
separated from the rest it will be rejected and the remainder estab-
lished.
The same court, later quoting and approving this proposition,
Ohio ex rel. v. Board of Education, 35 0. S. 519, points out the
danger of inaccurate thinking along this line and the necessity of
clearly distinguishing this rule from another closely related, but
leading to a different result.
It is there said: "Care must be taken not to confound this rule
with another equally well-settled, that where one of two considera-
tions is illegal, and the other legal, the illegality of the one avoids
,he promise founded on both.
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"In the former case there is one lawful and valuable considera-
tion to support two promises, one legal, the other illegal, whieh are
separable. In the latter case there are two considerations, one legal,
the other illegal, to support one promise. The reason for this well-
marked distinction is that, in the latter case, the promise being
supported by two considerations, one lawful, the other unlawful, is
an entirety based upon both, and cannot be apportioned, and it is
against public policy to enforce a promise so supported. In such
case, both considerations as a whole are the basis of the entire
promise.
"Where, however, the whole consideration is lawful, and the
promisor undertakes to do two things, one that is lawful and the
other unlawful, and they are clearly distinguishable, the good con-
sideration will support the lawful promise."
While the court's conclusion is correct it is assumed that there
must of necessity be two contracts of different kinds to illustrate
the two rules under consideration.
This view is the basis for the somewhat inaccurate language in
a portion of the opinion. If, for illustration, a single con-
tract is taken, wherein A promises to do two or more distinct things,
one of which is legal and the other illegal or void, in consideration
of which promise B agrees to pay $iooo, B, upon performing his
-promise, may waive the void or illegal promise of A and enforce A's
valid promise, 'although both stand as the consideration for B's
promise. On the other hand, A will not be able to enforce the con-
tract against B, since the void or illegal as well as the legal portion
formed a part of the consideration. He cannot make a valid tender
of all he agreed to do and hence, cannot so place B in default as
to have a right of action against him.
The courts are not clear concerning the nature or extent of the
illegal promise, so combined with a legal promise, which may be
waived by the other party to the contract, but it would seem that
such illegal promise must not be malum in se, or of a criminal
nature.
It was decided in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, i Wall. 221,
Mr. Justice Swaine delivering the opinion, that where some parts of
a contract are illegal while others are legal, the legal may be sep-
arated from the illegal if there be no imputation of malum in se;
and if the good part show a cause of action, that it is error to sus-
tain a demurrer to the whole. Referring to counsel's contention
that certain provisions of the contract were invalid, he said: "Con-
ceding this to be so, they are clearly separable and severable from
the parts which are relied upon. The rule in such cases, where
YALE LAW JOURNAL
there is no imputation of malum in se is, that the bad parts do not
affect the good. The valid may be enforced." The same doctrine
is stated in United States v. Bradley, io Peters, 366, and is sup-
ported by the citation of many authorities by Mr. Justice Story,
who delivered the opinion in that case.
Among other things bearing upon the subject, he says: "That
bonds and other deeds may, in many cases, be good in part and void
for the residue, where the residue is founded in illegality, but not
inalum in se, is a doctrine well-founded in the common law and
has been recognized from a very early period. . . . The doc-
trine has been maintained and is settled law at the present day in
all cases where the different covenants are severable and independent
of each other and do not import malum in se."
In the case of The Erie Ry. Co. v. U. L. & E. Co., 35 N. J. L.
?4o, the question arose upon the provisions of a contract, part of
which were legal and the other illegal. The defendants, common
carriers, had bound themselves to give to plaintiffs the exclusive
right to carry locomotives and tenders on trucks over plaintiff's
road, and this provision was illegal and was connected with other
provisions in the contract which were legal. Both the legal and the
illegal provisions were supported by the same consideration moving-
from plaintiff.
The defendant refused to perform the contract or any part of it.
and plaintiff sued for damages on account of the breach of the legal
provisions. Defendant maintained that, since one of the provisions
was illegal, the others were also void; but the court held that plain-
tiff could recover on the stipulations which were legal. The court
said: "Admitting then for the purpose of the argument the ille-
gality insisted upon, the legal problem plainly is this, whether,
where a defendant has agreed to do two things which are entirely
distinct, and one of them is prohibited by law, and the other is legal
and unobjectionable, such illegality of the one stipulation can be set
up as a bar to a suit for a breach of the latter and valid one.
An examination of the authorities will show that the rule of law upon
the subject has, from the earliest times, been at rest."
The court then asserts that from the time of Pigot's Case to the
present time the courts have universally admitted the doctrine, and
many authorities are cited to sustain the proposition.'
The court further says, however, that the doctrine will not
i. Chesman v. Nahtby, 2 Lord Raymond, 1456; 3 Bro. Parl. C., 349;
Mallan v. May, ii M. & W. 653; Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346; Gaskelt
v. King, ii East, 165; Nichols v. Stretton, io Adol. & El. 346; Chester
v. Freedland, Ley R. ig; Sheerman v. Thompson, 14 Adol. & El. 1027.
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embrace cases where the objectionable stipulation is for the per-
formance of an immoral or criminal act, for the reason that such
an ingredient will taint the entire contract and render it unenforce-
able in all its parts.
This reservation in the doctrine, which prevents its application
when there are provisions in a contract which are immoral or crimi-
nal or malum in se, strips it of many objectionable features, and
avoids a conflict with another well-established rule of law, that
where there are a number of considerations and any one of them is
illegal, the whole agreement is avoided.
It is true that the two rules often seem in conflict, and it will be
found that the courts have not always clearly distinguished between
them. A few authorities may be found, even, holding that the
plaintiffs, who made the legal and the illegal promise, may sue upon
the legal promise, where it has been performed, and the other party
has failed to perform his part of the contract.2
These authorities can only be sustained on the ground that the
objectionable provisions in the contracts were not illegal, in the
sense of being wicked or criminal, but simply void, and that, being
so, defendant had no right to rely upon them, since they had no
effect upon the contract.
In Higgins et al. v. Gager, 47 S. W. 848, plaintiff made by parol
a lease of a certain saloon to defendant for one year, and agreed
not to sell cigars in his hotel for a period longer than one year. In
consideration of these two promises defendant agreed to pay plain-
tiff $55 per month for one year. The court held that while the parol
lease for one year was valid, that plaintiff's promise not to sell cigars
for a period longer than one year fell within that clause of the
Statute of Frauds which prohibits any action upon any contract
promise or agreement, that is not to be performed within one year
from the making thereof, unless in writing. The court admitted
that this part of its decision was in conflict with the decisions of
other jurisdictions, citing Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208. Holding
that this portion of plaintiff's promise was unenforceable, it then
concluded that plaintiff had no right of action against defendant
who had refused to perform his part of the contract. Here plaintiff
had made two promises, one to lease land to defendant, which was
valid, the other to refrain from selling cigars, which the court said
was not enforceable. Because of the ineffectiveness of the one
plaintiff could not sue the defendant, who, in consideration thereof,
2. King v. King, 63 0. S. 363; Rosenbaum v. U. S. Credit System Co., 65
N. J. L. 255; 48 AtI. 235; Fishel v. Gray, 6o N. J. L. 5.
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had made one valid promise. Had the parties to this action 'been
reversed, the court would doubtless have held that he who made the
single valid promise could have waived the unenforceable promise
of the other party, and have sued upon that which was valid.
It is important to keep in mind the three classes of promises
which have already been mentioned: promises which are malum in
se or criminal; promises which are simply illegal and void (not
criminal), and those which are neither illegal nor void but are only
unenforceable.
Those of the first class, when connected with valid promises
forming the consideration for a contract, make the whole contract
void.
Those of the second class, when thus united with valid promises,
may, when separable, be waived by the promisee and the valid
enforced. But in this case he who has made both the .legal and the
illegal promise, cannot enforce the promise of the other party because
he cannot make a valid offer to perform all his part of the contract.
This is well illustrated-by Pettit's Admr. v. Pettit's Distributees, 32
Ala. 288.
But those of the third class have no power or tendency to con-
taminate or to make void the valid agreements with which they are
connected, and if they can be separated from them the latter will be
readily enforced by him who made the simple valid promise.
The most frequent illustration of the rule will be found in those
cases involving agreements in restraint of trade.'
These cases also well illustrate both sides of the question.
In the case of Bishop v. Palmer et al., 146 Mass. 469, plaintiff's
action was for damages on account of defendant's breach of a
contract wherein plaintiff had agreed for a certain amount to sell
to defendant his business and had bound himself in the same con-
tract not to enter or engage in said business anywhere for a period
of five years. The court held that, as the latter provision of the
contract was an agreement against public policy, plaintiff could not
enforce the promise of defendant to buy, and had no right of action
against him for a breach of the agreement; but conceded that if
defendant had been willing to perform the contract and had sued
plaintiff for its breach he might have recovered on that promise of
plaintiff which was valid, waiving that which was invalid.
Mallan v. May, ii M. & W,. and Green v. Price, 13 M. & W.,
were cited to sustain this view. The former was a case concerning a
3. Dean v. Emerson, io2 Mass. 480; Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 579;
Thomas v. Miles, 3 0. S. 274; Mallan v. May, ii M. & W. 262.
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contract between two physicians, wherein the defendant agreed not
to practice his profession in London nor in certain other named
towns. Defendant had broken the contract by practicing both in
London and the other towns during the stipulated period. Plaintiff
sought to recover damages for the breach of the cointract.
Defendant contended that since the covenant not to practice in
the other named towns was held to be invalid as" a restraint of trade,
although the agreement to practice in London was valid, the
whole contract was void and neither promise could be enforced.
But the court held that the plaintiff had a good cause of action
for defendant's breach of the valid stipulation.
The syllabus of Green v. Price gives accurately the point of
the decision sustaining the same view and is as follows:
"By deed reciting that A and B had carried on business as
perfumers in copartnership, and that it had been agreed between
them that B, in consideration of 2,Ioo pounds, should assign to A
his moiety of the good will, stock, etc., of the copartnership, B,
in consideration thereof, covenanted that he would not at any time
during his life carry on the trade of a perfumer within the cities of
London and Westminster, or within the distance of 6oo miles from
the same respectively; and for the observance of this covenant he
bound himself in the sum of 5,ooo pounds, by way of liquidated
damages.
"Held-That this covenant was divisible and was good so far
as it related to the cities of London and Westminster, though void
as to the 6oo miles; that a breach that defendant carried on the trade
in the city of London was good; and that A was entitled to recover
in respect to such breach the whole sum of 5,ooo pounds."
The weight of authority sustains the foregoing doctrine, which
seems to be sound and logical where plaintiff's portion of the con-
tract is executed. If, however, one promise is illegal and void,
though not malum in se, and is connected with another promise which
is good, there then arises the problem whether the promisee can
enforce the valid promise if his part of the contract is unexecuted.
In nost of the decided cases where the promisee was permitted to
enforce the valid promise, he had already performed his part of the
agreement. But should the question be raised in an action on a
bilateral executory contract, the plaintiff seeking to enforce the
valid and waive the illegal promise, it would seem, in such case that
he would fail to establish a contract, because of lack of consideration
to bind defendant.
In such a contract it seems clear that the promisee is not bound,
and that he who has promised to do the two things, one of which is
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illegal, cannot compel the promisee to perform. It is well settled
that if one party to a contract is not bound because of lack of con-
sideration, neither is the other party bound. There must be mutu-
ality of promises.'
Where the promise of one party is the consideration of the prom-
ise of the other, the promises must be concurrent and obligatory
on both parties at the same time.
5
The rule, then, which provides where there are two promises,
one legal, the other illegal, for one valid consideration, that the prom-
isee may enforce the legal promise, can only apply in those cases
where the consideration is executed, and where, therefore, no ques-
tion can arise- as to a consideration for the promise sought to be
enforced.
But it must be observed that this principle does not apply to
promises which are unenforceable only because they fall within the
Statute of Frauds. Such promises are not illegal, but form
a perfect contract, including the element of consideration, and it is
immaterial in the discussion of this question whether they are exe-
cuted or executory. They are not even void unless the statute so
provides, and even if they were, not being illegal, they would in no
way taint or destroy valid promises with which they are joined. In
Rosenbaum v. U. S. Credit System Co., 65 N. J. L., 255, 48 Atl.
Rep. 237, the court said:
"In most of the cases in which it has been held that if a promise
forming part of the consideration of a contract is illegal, the whole
consideration is void, it will be found that to do the thing promised
was illegal or immoral."
The court asserts that the only case to be found which holds that
where one promise is merely void and not illegal, making other
promises invalid, is Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 187, and it is affirmed
that the reasoning in that case is its own refutation. Other cases may
be found wherein the doctrine is laid down that where one promise
is void because it falls within the Statute of Frauds, other promises
connected therewith thereby become void, though they would, if
standing alone, be valid.
If the doctrine of Pigot's Case be sound, if a promise which is
illegal and therefore void will not, when joined with a legal promise,
prevent the enforcement of the latter, it is difficult to perceive the
reason for holding that a promise which is perfectly good, but
4. Keep v. Goodrich, 12 Johns. N. Y. 397; Buckingham vr. Ludhern, 40
N. J. 422.
5. Tucker v. Woods, 12 Johns. 19o; Keep & Hale v. Goodrich, 12 Johns.
397; Lees v. Whitcomb, 2 Mo. & P. 86.
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merely unenforceable because it falls within the Statute of Frauds,
should prevent the enforcement of a distinct valid promise with
which it is connected.
Yet it has been said that such a promise being void will invali-
date others connected therewith. Thus in Pond v. Sheehan, 8 L. R.
A. 414 (Ill.), the court concludes its opinion as follows:
"The contract . . . if void as to real estate must also be held
void as to personal property."
Meyers v. Schemp, 67 Ill. 469, is cited to support this proposi-
tion.
Turning to the latter case it will be found that the same doctrine
is there laid down and Cook v. Tombs, 2 Aust. 240, and Lea v. Bar-
ber, 2 Aust. 425, are cited as authority for the proposition.
These English cases to which this doctrine is traced were over-
ruled in the later case of Wood v. Benson, decided in the Court of
Exchequer in 1831, where the point was distinctly made that part
of the promise fell within the Statute of Frauds and that therefore
all was void. But the court held that a recovery could be had upon
that promise which was not within the statute. Bayley, B., said:
"I take it to be perfectly clear that an agreement may be void
as to one part, and not of necessity void as to the other. It by no
means follows that because you cannot sustain a contract in whole,
you cannot sustain it in part."
In a number of cases where the actions were for specific per-
formance the rule is stated that where part of the agreements are
void, all are void. This, of course, would be true in those actions
brought to enforce specific performance of parol sales of land, with
which were connected agreements to sell personal property. But
in Debeerski v. Paige, 36 N. Y. 537, the court held that:
"If a part of an entire contract is void under the Statute of
Frauds, the whole is void; a party will not be permitted to separate
the parts of an entire agreement and recover on one part, the other
being void."
An examination of this case will readily convince any one that
it is not in accord with the well-established doctrines stated above,
which are supported by both reason and authority. Of this case
that which was said of Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 187, applies:
"The reasoning in the case is its own refutation."
It is in conflict with the rule in Ohio which supports the early
doctrine found in Pigot's Case.'
6. Lange v. Werke, 2 0. S. 5$9; Thomas v. Adm. of Miles, 3 0. S. 274;
Widoe v. Webb, 2o 0. S. 435; Ohio ex rel. v. Board of Education, 35 0. S.
5i9; King v. King, 63 0. S. 363.
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Many recent cases establish a contrary doctrine which is now
all but universal.
In Rund et al. v. Mather, ii Cush. i, where part of the promise
fell within the Statute of Frauds and part did not, the court laid
down this rule:
"If any part of an agreement is valid, it will avail pro tanto,
though another part of it may be prohibited by statute; provided the
statute does not either expressly or by necessary implication render
the whole void; and provided further that the sound part can be
separated from the unsound and be enforced without injustice to
the defendant."
In Henley v. Donovan, 182 Mass. at page 68, the court says:
"Where the plaintiff has done work in consideration of the
defendant's promising to do two things, the promise to do one being
valid, the promise to do the other being within the Statute of Frauds,
. . . the plaintiff can, if he chooses, forego all rights by reason
of having been promised two things and enforce the performance of
the one for which the promise is valid."
It is difficult to state any rule bearing upon this subject against
which some authority may not be cited. But the following rules
may be stated, being well supported by authority:
(a) Where two or more promises are made, part of which are
legal and part illegal (not malum in se) in consideration of a legal
promise, he who has made the legal promise may waive those prom-
ises which are illegal and enforce those which are legal, provided
his part of the contract has been performed; but if his promise is
also executory the contract being bilateral and being partly illegal
cannot be enforced by either party thereto:
(b) But the contract cannot be enforced in any event by the
party who made the illegal promise.
(c) If the illegal promise, so connected with a legal promise, is
malum in se, or is a promise to perform a criminal act, the whole
contract is void and unenforceable by either party thereto.
(d) But if the promise, so connected with a valid legal promise,
is not illegal, but simply unenforceable, as one falling within the
Statute of Frauds, it will not prevent the party who has made a legal
promise on the other side, though it be executory, from waiving
such unenforceable promise and enforcing the remaining promise.
W. P. Rogers.
Cincinnati Law School.
